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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between various market imperfections and the skill pre-
mium. The model in this paper assumes perfectly competitive labor markets but distorted product
and financial markets. The model predicts that the skill premium is positively correlated with market
power, modeled using preference for variety, and shorter product cycles. The effect from financial
market distortions or taxes on financial income is ambiguous. Positive external effects among firms
developing new goods decrease the skill premium.
JEL: D33, D43, D50, D91, D92, J31, L13, O31
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1 Introduction
After several decades of decreasing wage inequality, most industrialized countries have experienced
substantial increases in the dispersion of wages. The U.S. and the U.K. witnessed the change in the early
1980s while many other industrialized countries have seen similar changes during the second half of the
∗This work was done at the Department of Economics at Göteborg University. I would like to thank prof. Douglas A. Hibbs,
Jr., Wlodek Bursztyn, Håkan Locking, and prof. Henry Ohlsson for comments on earlier drafts.
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1980s or early in the 1990s (Juhn et al. 1993; Gottschalk 1997; Glyn 2001). The dramatic changes in
the wage distribution has generated a large literature that has tried to explain the changes, see for example
Acemoglu (2002); Aghion (2002). This literature has increased the understanding of what factors that
are important in explaining the distribution of wages. This paper adds to this literature by providing
further insight into how market power, the length of the product cycle, and financial market distortions,
is related to the return to skill, i.e. the skill premium.
The main result in the paper is that greater market power, modeled by greater preference for variety
by consumers, increases the skill premium, shorter product cycles increase the skill premium, capital
taxation or capital market distortions have an ambiguous impact on the skill premium, and positive ex-
ternalities among firms developing new goods decrease the skill premium. A fundamental characteristic
of the model in this paper is the division of labor tasks into two distinct categories, production and de-
velopment, which have different skill requirements. The model postulates that only high-skill workers
do development work while only low-skill workers do production work, a crude implementation of the
hypothesis that development is human capital intensive.
Further, the model postulates that development must always precede production. Development is
costly and financed by households via ownership. Product markets are not perfectly competitive, imply-
ing that in equilibrium the profit rate is sufficiently high to motivate households to invest in owner shares.
A key insight necessary to understand the predictions of the model is that while production employment
increases with competitiveness, development employment decreases because lower profits imply less
incentive to develop new products. Therefore the skill premium is closely related to market power.
1.1 Related Literature
The connection between market power, via the ability to pay, and wage premia is well documented by,
among others, Blanchflower et al. (1996), Nickell et al. (1994). and Nickell (1999). The discussion gener-
ally concerns the distribution of labor market rents among workers and owners via collective bargaining
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between firm and union representatives. This paper on the other hand assumes perfectly competitive
labor markets, thereby departing from the assumptions of most labor economists.
This paper has similarities with Mendez (2002), which studies the relation between product life
cycles and wage inequality. In Mendez’s dual labor market setting, efficiency wages are paid to workers
producing goods in the early stage of the product cycle, while competitive wages are paid to workers
producing goods in the later stage of the product cycle. In Mendez setting, shorter product cycles affect
wage inequality, but in an ambiguous direction.1
In Glazer and Ranjan (2001) preference for variety contributes to increased wage differences be-
tween high and low-skill workers. However, in Glazer and Ranjan’s paper, the main assumption is that
high-skill workers prefer consuming goods produced by high-skill labor, while low-skill workers prefers
consuming goods produced by low-skill labor. Preference for variety is a necessary assumption because,
in the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) framework, increasing the number of variations of a good generates a
positive externality, increasing the utility of every other variation of the good.
The paper by Dinopoulos and Segerström (1999) is somewhat similar to this paper. Both papers con-
nect the profitability of development, labeled research in Dinopoulos and Segerström, with the demand
for high-skill workers. However, in Dinopoulos and Segerström lower tariff rates motivate more devel-
opment, via higher temporary Schumpeterian profits. In both papers, high-skill workers benefit, relative
to low-skill workers, from higher profits. Other studies where high-skill workers do “fixed cost work”
and low-skill workers do “production work” are Ranjan (2001), Ekholm and Midelfart (2005), and Burda
and Dluhosch (2002). None of those papers investigate the impact of changing the preference for variety,
the length of the product cycle, financial market distortions, or externalities among firms developing new
goods.
An integral part of the model is preference for variety in consumption, modeled using the same
1Mendez is primarily concerned with residual wage inequality, i.e. wage inequality between workers with similar observable
characteristics, but he also briefly discusses the skill premium, which is shown to be positively correlated with residual wage
inequality.
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setup as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). The preference for variety provides firms with some market power.
Without market power firms would not be able mark up prices above marginal cost, which is necessary
to recapture development costs.
1.2 Plan of the Paper
The production side of the model is laid out in Section 2. Section 3 gives the various market clearing
conditions. In Section 4 the intertemporal choices by households are analyzed, the model is closed, and
the results are presented. Section 5 summarizes and discusses the results. Appendix A supplies a record
of notation used in the paper. Lengthy derivations are presented in Appendices B and C.
2 Model
The model is dynamic, and solved in three stages. In the first stage (Section 2) the instantaneous choices
made by households and firms are analyzed. In the second stage (Section 3) the instantaneous equilibrium
conditions are added to the model. Finally, in the third stage (Section 4) the intertemporal choices of
households together with the necessary steady state conditions are used to solve the model.
Consider an economy consisting of L households, each with a single divisible labor unit. A fraction
φL of the households supply high-skill labor and (1− φ)L supply low-skill labor. There are two types
of goods in the economy, a consumption good and a capital good. There are nL different variations of
the consumption good, where n denotes the number of variations per household. There are nL different
production firms producing variations of the consumption good. Hence, every production firm produces
a single variation of the consumption good. New variations are developed by development firms.
Let k denote the amount of capital per household. The amount of capital available for use in produc-
tion, kL, is determined endogenously. Capital depreciates and must constantly be reproduced. Capital
is chosen as the numeraire good and its price is normalized to unity. It is assumed that households sup-
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ply firms with capital via financial markets, but households are subject to a capital tax or some other
distortion.
The consumption good is more attractive to produce because households care for variety, which
provide firms with some market power. However, the lifetime of any variation of the consumption good
is limited and uncertain. If a variation of the consumption good becomes obsolete, the firm can not sell
any output and the firm is shut down. The market for real capital is perfectly competitive with zero
profits.
2.1 Demand
Let y denote household net income, c household consumption, s household saving in capital, and m
household development saving. Let y, c, s and m denote the corresponding averages over all households.
Consider any household in the economy with a net income of y and let consumption be given by
c = y−s−m. Total saving by a household is s+m = y−c. Total saving falls into two different categories,
real capital and owner shares (development saving). By purchasing s worth of newly produced capital,
households add new capital to its existing stock of capital. By providing development firms with m worth
of financial capital households can increase its stock of owner shares in production firms, n.
The household devotes c for consumption of the single consumption good. Instantaneous utility is
characterized by:
u(c) = u [v(c)] . (1)
The auxiliary v(c) function is defined by optimal allocation of consumption over the different variations
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of the consumption good, given the household’s choice of consumption spending, c:
v(c) = max
~x
[
nL
∑
i=1
x
1−β
i
] 1
1−β
(2)
s.t.
nL
∑
i=1
pixi = c.
The variable xi denotes the household’s consumption of the ith variation of the consumption good.
β ∈ [0,1) parameterizes household demand for variety, and thereby also contributes to market power
of production firms. The solution to this problem (see Appendix B for a derivation) is easily obtained:
xi(c) =
c
p1/βi pˆ
(3a)
v(c) = cpˆ
β
1−β (3b)
pˆ =
nL
∑
i=1
p
β−1
β
i . (3c)
Since the demand function is linear in c, aggregate demand is consistently analyzed using a represen-
tative agent with average consumption spending. Therefore let c denote the average of all households’
consumption spending:
xi(c) =
cL
p1/βi pˆ
. (4)
Relation (4) together with (3c) defines the demand function for any variation of the consumption good.
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2.2 Capital Producers
The price of capital is normalized to unity, and the technology for capital production is given by a
Cobb-Douglas production function in low-skill labor and capital. Capital producing firms operate on a
perfectly competitive market, which is a logical assumption since capital produced by different firms are
perfect substitutes in all production activities. The constant return to scale technology and the zero profit
condition implies that the number of firms competing is indeterminate, but production of capital can be
modeled as if there is a single price taking firm. The firm manager solves the following problem:
max
Kk,Lk
alKαk L
1−α
k − rKk−wlLk.
The capital producer hires low-skill labor, Lk, and capital Kk. The Kk units of capital are rented from
households. The wage rate of low-skill workers is denoted wl and r denotes the interest rate for capital.
Overall productivity is denoted by al , the marginal rate of technical substitution between capital and
labor is given by αLk [(1−α)Kk]−1.
Each household saves s in capital and thereby demands s new capital units. Aggregate demand
for new capital therefore equals sL. Combing the first order conditions for the problem above with the
aggregate demand for capital, i.e. sL = alKαk L
1−α
k , yields the factor demand functions for firms producing
capital:
Kk(s,r) =
αsL
r
(5a)
Lk(s,wl) =
(1−α)sL
wl
. (5b)
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2.3 Consumption Good Producers
The production technology used by consumption good producers is the same Cobb-Douglas technology
used by capital producers. Let bc denote the corresponding cost function. A firm producing a variation
of the consumption good can alter the employment of low-skill production workers instantly. Therefore,
given production during a short interval of time, the firm solves the following problem:
max
pi
pixi−bc(xi) (6)
s.t. xi =
cL
p1/βi pˆ
bc(xi) =
xi
al
[ r
α
]α[ wl
1−α
]1−α
.
The firm maximizes revenues minus cost under the demand and technology constraint. The demand con-
straint is given by relation (4) and the technology constraint is given by the cost function, corresponding
to the Cobb-Douglas production function. The firm treats all variables, except the price of the firm’s own
variation, pi, as given, i.e. ∂ pˆ/∂pi = 0. This is perfectly consistent with rational behavior only if the
number of competing firms is infinite, i.e. nL → ∞. Solving the maximization problem (see Appendix
C) implies:
pi =
rαw1−αl
al(1−β)αα(1−α)1−α (7a)
xi(c,n) =
al(1−β)αα(1−α)1−αc
nrαw1−αl
(7b)
pici(c,n) =
βc
n
. (7c)
8
It is immediately clear that zero profits can only occur in two ways; either households do not care for
variety and firms have no market power, i.e. β = 0, or the number of firms producing variations is infinite,
i.e. nL → ∞. Labor and capital demand functions conditioned on the quantity produced, xi, materialize
in the process of deriving the cost function, bc. Inserting the quantity given by (7b) yields the factor
demand functions for firms producing the consumption good:
kci(c,n,r) =
α(1−β)c
nr
(8a)
lci(c,n,wl) =
(1−α)(1−β)c
nwl
. (8b)
2.4 Development Firms
New variations can be developed by combining high-skill labor and capital. More formally, a firm hiring
kd j units of capital and hd j units of high-skill labor produces the “development intensity” z j. Depending
on the model, z j can have different interpretations.
In a continuous time setting, it is logical for z j to represent a firm-specific Poisson process intensity,
where a development event implies that the firm succeeds in developing a new variation of the consump-
tion good. During a short period of length dt, the probability that a single development event occurs is
z jdt.
The logical equivalence in a discrete time setting is that z j represents the mean of a Poisson dis-
tributed random variable, where z jdt is the expected number of successful developments events during a
given time period, dt. Alternatively in the discrete time setting z j can represent some index increasing in
the expected number of successful developments.
The technology available for producing the “development intensity” is:
z j =
[
ahkγd jh
1−γ
d j
]σ
z1−σ (9a)
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σ ∈ (0,1).
Hence, by hiring more high-skill labor and capital, a development firm increases the probability devel-
oping a new variation, or the expected number of new successful developments. If σ equals unity, there
are no externalities and the production function for development intensity reduces to a standard Cobb-
Douglas production function. However as σ approaches zero, the incentive to free ride increases as a
given firm’s development effort become less important relative to the average effort, denoted by z.
The parameter ah parameterizes overall development efficiency and γ denotes the relative importance
of capital compared to high-skill labor. If a Poisson event occurs, the firm succeeds in developing a new
variation of the consumption good. The associated cost function, bd , and factor demand functions for
development firms are:
bd(z j) =
1
ah
[
r
γ
]γ[
wh
1− γ
]1−γ[ z j
z1−σ
]1/σ
(9b)
kd(z j,r,wh) =
1
ah
[
γwh
(1− γ)r
]1−γ[ z j
z1−σ
]1/σ
(9c)
hd(z j,r,wh) =
1
ah
[
(1− γ)r
γwh
]γ [ z j
z1−σ
]1/σ
. (9d)
Those functions are easily derived noting that the production function, see (9a), is a standard Cobb-
Douglas function with productivity ahz1−σ and exponents γσ and (1− γ)σ.
3 Equilibrium Conditions
The previous section described the overall economy and the behavior of every household and every firm.
The following section imposes market clearing conditions. At every moment in time the market for high-
skill and low-skill labor must clear; every unit of newly produced capital must be sold and every existing
unit of capital must be rented by a development or production firm.
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3.1 The Market for Low-Skill Labor
Low-skill workers can be employed either by a firm producing capital or any of nL firms producing
different variations of the consumption good. Full employment implies:
Lk(s,wl)+ nLlci(c,n,wl) = (1−φ)L.
Low-skill labor demand for capital production, Lk(s,wl), can be replaced by the factor demand function
in (5b). n and lci(c,n,wl) are eliminated replacing the factor labor demand function using (8b). Solving
for wl:
wl =
(1−α) [(1−β)c+ s]
1−φ . (10a)
Low-skill workers benefit both from increased consumption and increased capital savings. Both increase
aggregate production, to the advantage of low-skill workers. Stronger preference for variety provides
production firms with some market power, which decreases supply and thereby the demand for produc-
tion workers, i.e. low-skill workers.
3.2 The Market for High-Skill Labor
Given that a high-skill or low-skill worker save m by financing development of a new product, it is clear
from the cost function (9b) and the factor demand function (9d), that the household employs m(1−γ)/wh
high-skill labor units. Total high-skill labor demand therefore equals:
φL
∑
i=1
1− γ
wh
mhi +
(1−φ)L
∑
i=1
1− γ
wh
mli =
1− γ
wh
mL.
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Assuming full employment, simplifying, and solving for wh yields:
wh =
1− γ
φ m. (10b)
It is immediately clear that high-skill workers benefit from more development saving. Realizing that
consumption, real capital saving, and development saving are rival, high-skill and low-skill workers’
wages are clearly driven by very different underlying forces.
The wage rate of low-skill workers is adversely affected by preference for variety directly via the
1−β term, as seen by (10a). The effect of preference for variety is likely to be the opposite for high-skill
workers. A larger β increases the profit rate of firms producing variations of the consumption good,
increasing the incentives to invest in development firms, i.e. increasing m.
3.3 The Markets for Capital
Households supply production and development firms with capital. Since there is no alternative usage
for capital, aggregate capital supply equals kL. Demand for capital by firms producing capital, Kk(s,r),
is given by (5a). There are nL production firms. Each production firm’s demand for capital is given by
the factor demand function in (8a).
Aggregate capital demand by development firms is obtained by summing over every household’s de-
velopment investment. By the cost function and factor demand functions in (9b) and (9c), any household
investing m in development hires mγ/r units of capital. Aggregating over all households is straightfor-
ward, and equalizing aggregate capital supply with aggregate capital demand implies:
r =
α [(1−β)c+ s]+ γm
k
. (10c)
The interest rate increases if consumption, capital investments or development saving increase, since
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capital is used in production as well as development.
New capital is produced by capital production firms and bought by households. Aggregate household
spending on, and thereby demand for, new capital equals sL. The aggregate supply is given by the
production function of capital producers, i.e. alKαk L
1−α
k , together with the factor demand functions in
(5a) and (5b). Clearing the market for new capital implies:
1 =
[α
r
]α[1−α
wl
]1−α
. (10d)
4 Intertemporal Choices
This section closes the model by analyzing the intertemporal behavior of households. Given the intertem-
poral choices of households, it is possible to determine average consumption, c, average capital saving,
s, and average development saving, m. Several possible configurations are possible. For example, the
model can be set in either continuous or discrete time, or populated by infinitely lived households or
overlapping generations of households. The configuration used here is a continuous time setting with
infinitely lived households.
4.1 A Simple Household Model
The income of any household in the economy can be written as:
y = w +(1− τ)(rk + pin)+ τ(rk + pin), (11)
where w denotes the wage rate; wl for a household that supplies low-skill labor and wh for a household
that supplies high-skill labor. k denotes the amount of capital owned by the household, n denotes the
number of production firms, i.e. shares, the household owns, and τ is a tax on financial income or more
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general a capital market distortion. The second term, (1− τ)(rk + pin) is the financial income from
owning capital and production firms. rk captures interest payments by firms renting the household’s
capital, and pi captures dividend payments.
The parameter τ ∈ [0,1) has two interpretations. Either it parameterizes a financial market imper-
fection, i.e. a transaction cost paid by households collected by financial market intermediaries. In this
case, the fourth term, τr(k + pi) distributes the profits earned by financial intermediaries uniformly over
all households. Alternatively τ can be viewed as a tax on savings, paid by households, where the tax
revenues are uniformly distributed as a lump sum to each household.
4.1.1 Consumption and Saving
Households maximize the discounted value of lifetime utility of consumption:
R
∞
0 e
−ρtu(c)dt. At every
moment in time the household must obey the instantaneous budget constraint c = y− s−m, i.e. divide
its income into consumption, c, saving in real capital, s, and saving by financing development, m. Let
k′ denote the next period’s capital holding. The law of motion for capital is k′ = (1−δdt)k + sdt, given
that the price of capital is normalized to unity and the depreciation rate is δ.
Development saving by some household is m. The probability that the development firm succeeds
is z(m)dt. Clearly, development saving is risky. To simplify, it is assumed that households cross-insure
their savings in individual development firms, thereby completely eliminating risk. The law of motion
for shares in production firms is: n′ = (1− qdt)n + z(m)dt. qdt parameterizes the probability that the
variation produced by a specific production firm becomes obsolete, i.e. that a shut down shock occurs
with probability qdt. The decisions of a rational household satisfies:
V (k,n) = max
s,m
u(c)dt + 1
1+ ρdt EV (k
′,n′) (12)
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s.t c = y− s−m
k′ = (1−δdt)k + sdt
n′ = (1−qdt)n+ z(m)dt.
Differentiating the value function and using the first order conditions result in the following characteri-
zation of optimal consumption and development saving:
(1− τ)r = ρ+ δ− cu
′′(c)
u′(c)
Ec˙/c (13a)
(1− τ)z′(m)pi = ρ+ q− cu
′′(c)
u′(c)
Ec˙/c+
mz′′(m)
z′(m)
Em˙/m. (13b)
Those relations form a no-arbitrage relation between the returns from capital and development saving.
4.1.2 Steady State
If the economy is in steady state, the change in consumption and development saving is zero, i.e. c˙ = 0,
and m˙ = 0. Further, the household’s holdings of capital and owner shares does not change. From the
laws of motion, k′ = k → s = δk and n′ = n → z(m) = qn. Therefore in steady state:
r =
ρ+ δ
1− τ
(14a)
pi =
ρ+ q
(1− τ)z′(m)
(14b)
s(k) = δk (14c)
z(m) = qn (14d)
c = y−δk−bd(qn). (14e)
Due to the assumption that households are fully insured, development saving is non-stochastic. Com-
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bining (14a) and (14b) gives a steady state no-arbitrage condition:
pi =
ρ+ q
ρ+ δ
r
z′(m)
. (15)
The interpretation is straightforward. If the shut down intensity, q, is high relative to the depreciation
rate, δ, the profit rate must be higher to provide households with incentive to save in development. z′(m) is
the marginal “development productivity”. The marginal cost of saving in development is inversely related
to marginal productivity, and a high relative marginal development cost naturally makes households
demand a higher pay off, i.e. a higher profit rate, for saving in development instead of real capital.
4.1.3 Aggregation
Capital saving may differ among different households, but it is linear in capital wealth. Aggregating over
every household’s capital saving, given by (14c), implies:
s = δk. (16)
The model is most easily solved by assuming that σ is in the interval (0,1). If σ∈ (0,1) the probabil-
ity to succeed in developing a new variations is at lest partly, but not only, dependent on the development
efforts in other developing firms.
Replacing pi by use of (7c) and replacing z′(m) by use of the cost function in (9b), condition (14b)
defines a unique optimum for development saving:
m(c,n,r,wh,z) = z
[
σβ(1− τ)c
(ρ+ q)n
] 1
1−σ
[
ah
[γ
r
]γ[1− γ
wh
]1−γ] σ1−σ
. (17)
The most important property of household development saving is that it depends only on aggregate, non-
household specific, quantities. Therefore aggregate development saving is distributed uniformly over the
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population, and household and average development saving is identical.2
Given household saving in development firms, every household’s steady state wealth in shares can
be computed by use of relation (14d). Efficient development firms minimize costs. Using the inverse of
the cost function in (9b), and noting that bd = m, n is solved for as:
n =
z
q
[
ahσβ(1− τ)c
(ρ+ q)n
[γ
r
]γ [1− γ
wh
]1−γ] σ1−σ
. (18)
It is immediately clear that households’ share holdings, n, only depend on aggregate quantities and there-
fore, every household has the same amount of wealth in shares. This is of course a logical consequence
of the previous result that every household’s development saving is equalized. Using that n = n and
solving for n yields:
n(c,r,wh,z) =
[
z
q
]1−σ[
ahσβ(1− τ)c
ρ+ q
[γ
r
]γ[1− γ
wh
]1−γ]σ
. (19)
Inserting the average households’ share holdings, n, given by (19), into the expression for household and
average development saving, given by (17), reduces average development saving significantly:
m(c) =
σqβ(1− τ)c
ρ+ q . (20)
The market clearing conditions, i.e (10a), (10b) and (10c), provides the basic relations necessary to
solve for c, k and wh. The remaining endogenous variables can be solved or eliminated. The steady
state interest rate r is pinned down by (14a), and the wage rate for low-skill workers is then given by the
capital market clearing condition in (10d). Average capital saving, s, is eliminated by (16), and average
2With decreasing individual returns to development investment, σ < 1, efficiency requires uniform investments. This result
parallels the inequality growth result that a necessary condition for inequality to affect growth, via human capital investments,
is that capital markets are imperfect Aghion and Howitt (1998); Aghion et al. (1999). Capital on the other hand is not subject
to individual decreasing returns, and the distribution of capital does not affect efficiency.
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development saving, m, is eliminated by (20). The resulting system of three equations is:
(1−α)
[
(1−β)c+ δk]− (1−φ)wl = 0 (21a)
(ρ+ q)φwh− (1− γ)qσβ(1− τ)c = 0 (21b)
[α(ρ+ q)(1−β)+ γqσβ(1− τ)]c+(ρ+ q)(αδ− r)k = 0. (21c)
Solving this system is straightforward. To simplify the notation, let ∆ be defined as:
∆ ≡ rρ(1−β)(ρ+ q)+ qγσβδ(1− τ)> 0. (22)
The solution to the system is
r =
ρ+ δ
1− τ
(23a)
wl = (1−α)a
1
1−α
l
[α
r
] α
1−α (23b)
wh =
σqβ(1− γ)(r−αδ)
∆
1−φ
φ
wl
1−α
(23c)
k = αρ(1−β)+ q [α(1−β)+ γσβ(1− τ)]
∆
1−φ
1−α
wl (23d)
ω =
qσβ(1− γ)(1− τ)(r−αδ)
(1−α)∆
1−φ
φ , (23e)
where ω = wh/wl denotes the relative wage of high-skill workers, compared to low-skill workers. The
skill premium is defined as lnω.
4.2 Comparative Statics
The main concern of this paper is the return to skill. Since the steady state equilibrium conditions provide
analytically traceable expressions for all endogenous variables, the skill premium is easily investigated.
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To investigate what determines the skill premium, lnω is differentiated with respect to the key parameters
of the model.
Skill Composition The standard increased factor supply–decreased factor return logic holds for both
kinds of labor, as seen by the negative derivative of lnω with respect to the fraction of high-skill house-
holds, i.e. φ:
d lnω
dφ =
−1
φ(1−φ) < 0. (24a)
Hence, increasing the relative supply of high-skill households decreases the skill premium.
Preference for Variety The impact of preference for variety on the skill premium is described by the
derivative of lnω with respect to β. After some algebra:
d lnω
dβ =
(ρ+ δ)(ρ+ q)
β(1− τ)∆ > 0. (24b)
Increasing β makes households more inclined to spread out consumption more evenly over all varia-
tions given any fixed set of prices, implying greater market power for the producer of any variation. On
the one hand, it follows from (8b) that greater preferences for variety decreases the per firm demand for
low-skill labor as the supply of each firm decreases.
On the other hand, it is clear from (7c) that stronger preference for variety increases the value of a
firm producing a variation, which in turn increases the incentives to develop new variations. Naturally
greater incentives to develop new variations translates into increasing demand for high-skill workers; see
(14d). Therefore, in the short run, before the number production firms adjusts, increasing the preference
for variety increases the skill premium.
In the long run the number of production firms and development firms, n and m, changes, thereby al-
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tering the demand for high-skill and low-skill labor. As seen by the comparative statics and the reasoning
above, it is clear that in the short run as well as the long run increased preference for variety increases
the skill premium.
Taxation Increasing the tax rate on income from capital and owner shares, i.e. increasing τ, has an
ambiguous effect on the skill premium.
d lnω
dτ =
αδ
ρ+ δ [1−α(1− τ)] +
2qγσδβ
∆ −
1
1− τ
. (24c)
The sign is ambiguous and the effect is non-linear. It is easy to see, inspecting (22), that ∆ is bounded
and strictly positive as τ→ 1. This implies that for large distortions the derivative is infinitely negative. It
follows that if τ is sufficiently close to unity, improving the financial market increases the skill premium.
Hence improving sufficiently distorted financial markets increase the skill premium.
It is a bit surprising that the result is ambiguous. The high-skill labor market clearing condition in
(10b) implies that the wage rate for high-skill workers is proportional to the average saving in develop-
ment firms. Saving in development firms is in turn proportional to one minus the tax rate, i.e. 1− τ, as
seen by the steady state expression for m stated in (20). However, by the same expression, it is clear that
average development saving is proportional to average consumption spending, c. Increasing the tax rate
on financial income increases average consumption, and, the effect on development saving is therefore
ambiguous, as is the effect on the wage rate of high-skill workers.
The wage rate of low-skill workers clearly decreases as the tax rate increases. Increasing the tax rate
increases the steady state interest rate, and that lowers the wage rate of low-skill workers, as seen by
(23b). This is a equilibrium result. Capital is the numeraire good and the wage rate of low-skill workers
falls out, clearing the market for new capital. As its price is fixed, the wage rate of low-skill workers
must adjust to clear the market.
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Clearly it is difficult to predict a priori, whether financial market distortions increase or decrease the
skill premium. However, excluding capital from the model yields unambiguous results. Letting α → 0
and γ→ 0 renders capital redundant in the development and production processes. The derivative reduces
to:
d lnω
dτ =
−1
1−τ < 0
α → 0
γ → 0
. (24d)
Shut Down Intensity The expected lifetime of a variation of the consumption good is 1/q. Decreas-
ing the expected lifetime of variations of the consumption good, i.e. increasing q, increases the skill
premium:
d lnω
dq =
ρ(1−β)(ρ+ δ)
q(1− τ)∆ > 0. (24e)
On the one hand, decreasing the expected life of variations of the consumption good decreases in-
centives to develop new variations in the short run as lifetime profits decrease. On the other hand, in the
long run shorter life spans decrease the number of variations available, and thereby increase the profit
rate of each producer, increasing the incentives to save in development firms.
In steady state, increasing the shut down intensity, q, implies increasing average development saving
over average consumption, see (20). This shift in favor of development saving increases the demand for
high-skill workers, which increases the steady state wage rate. Shorter product cycles therefore raise the
skill premium.
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Development Externalities If development generates strong externalities, i.e. σ closer to zero, the
skill premium is smaller:
d ln ω
dσ =
(1−β)(ρ+ δ)(ρ+ δ+ q)
σ∆ > 0. (24f)
A smaller σ decreases every households marginal benefit from development saving, since the house-
holds are uncoordinated and fail to internalize their positive external effect on every other household. A
lower marginal benefit decreases the incentives to save by financing development firms, thereby decreas-
ing the demand for high-skill workers. In the end, the wage rate of high-skill workers must decrease to
maintain full employment.
5 Conclusions
The model presented in this paper puts forward the idea that if high-skill workers are mainly used in
developing goods and low-skill workers mainly are used in producing existing goods, various market
imperfections can alter the skill premium.
All actions by agents in the model are based on rational maximization of lifetime utility and profits
in a general equilibrium setting. However to simplify, only steady state results are considered. Therefore
all results pertain to the long run.
The model assumes perfectly competitive labor markets, and thereby departs from the existing branch
of literature investigating the effect of labor market imperfections on the wage rate. Capital market
distortions are also introduced. The paper’s main results are:
• Greater preference for variety in consumption increases the skill premium.
• Shorter product cycles increase the skill premium.
• Financial market distortions, such as taxes, changes the skill premium.
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• Positive externalities among firms developing new goods decrease the skill premium.
In the short run, preference for variety translates into market power for firms, increasing profits but
reducing supply. Reduced supply reduces the demand for production workers, i.e. low-skill workers.
Higher profits stimulates development of new variations of consumption good, thereby increasing the
demand for development workers, i.e. high-skill workers. However since the supply of low-skill and
high-skill workers is fixed, the decreased demand for low-skill workers translates into a lower wage rate,
and the increased demand for high-skill workers translates into a higher wage rate for high-skill workers.
Shorter product cycles, all else equal, reduces the profitability of developing new variations. In the
long run however, the number of variations decrease, but the income share spent on development relative
consumption increases, thereby increasing the skill premium. The model thereby points out shorter
product cycles to be a potential explanation for the increasing dispersion in wages during the last 30
years.
The result for taxation on non-labor income, is ambiguous. In a model without capital, a non-labor
tax decreases the skill premium. With capital, a necessary condition for a non-labor tax to decrease
the skill premium is that the initial tax is sufficiently high. This is a weak prediction, but nevertheless
the model hints that there is a connection between financial institutions and the skill premium, pointing
towards financial liberalization as a possible explanation of the changes in the skill premium during the
1980s.
If the probability to succeed in developing a new variation depend not only on the effort by the own
firm but also on the effort of other firms, then there are positive external effects among development firms.
Positive externalities among development firms provide incentives to free ride. Free riding decreases
saving in development firms, which in turn decrease both the demand for high-skill workers and the skill
premium.
The model presented in this can easily be extended on the household side in order to model, for
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example, distorted financial markets and different household characteristics, such as risk aversion or
different degrees of precautionary saving. The model, therefore, is rich in future research prospects.
Appendices
A Record of Notation
In general, any variable with an overbar represents an average, usually with respect to households or
households supplying either high-skill or low-skill labor. i is used to index a specific firm producing a
variation of the consumption good while j is used to index a specific development firm. A complete list
of the symbols used in the paper is presented in Table 1.
B Demand for Variations
The aim of this section is to derive the demand function for each variation of the consumption good,
given a certain degree of preference for variety. Preference for variety is modeled as in Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977). By consuming nL different variations of the consumption good, household utility is:
nL
∑
i=1
[
x
1−β
i
] 1
1−β
.
For β ∈ (0,1), consuming an extra unit of any of the variation decreases the marginal utility of yet an
extra unit of the same variation, and therefore consumers prefer to increase consumption of all variations.
Only if prices differ, will a single households consume different quantities of the different variations.
Given a fixed consumption budget c, a utility maximizing household must act as if solving the opti-
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Table 1: List of Symbols
Symbol Range Interpretation
α [0,1) Capital’s “weight” in production (Cobb-Douglas).
ah R+ High-skill workers’ productivity.
al R+ Low-skill workers’ productivity.
β [0,1) Preference for variety.
bc(·) R Cost function for production firms.
bd(·) R Cost function for development firms.
c R+ An arbitrary household’s consumption spending.
C R+ Aggregate consumption spending.
δ R Depreciation rate of capital.
∆ R Abbreviation, defined in (22).
γ [0,1) Capital’s “weight” in development (Cobb-Douglas).
hd R+ High-skill labor used by an arbitrary development firm.
k R+ An arbitrary household’s capital holding.
kd R+ Capital used by an arbitrary development firm.
Kk R+ Aggregate capital used producing capital.
L R+ Number, i.e. the measure, of households.
Lk R+ Aggregate low-skill labor used producing capital.
m R+ An arbitrary household’s investment in development.
n R+ An arbitrary household’s holding of development shares.
φ (0,1) Fraction of households supplying high-skill labor.
pic R+ An arbitrary consumptin firm’s profit rate.
p R+ Price of an arbitrary variation.
pˆ R+ Auxiliary price index.
q R Poisson intensity at which variations become obsolete.
ρ R Households’ discount rate.
r R Interest rate.
σ (0,1) 1 - σ: Free riding possibilities in developing.
s R An arbitrary household’s savings.
τ [0,1] Tax rate on non-labor income.
u(·) R Instantaneous utility function.
v(·) R Auxiliary utility function (w.r.t. variations).
V (·) R Lifetime utility.
ω R+ The skill premium, wh/wl .
wh R+ Wage rate for households supplying high-skill labor.
wl R+ Wage rate for households supplying low-skill labor.
x R+ Quantity of an arbitrary variation.
y R+ An arbitrary household’s income rate.
z R+ Development intensity of an arbitrary development firm.
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mization problem:
v(~x) = max
~x
nL
∑
i=1
[
x
1−β
i
] 1
1−β
s.t.
nL
∑
i=1
pixi = c.
Let µ denote the Lagrangian multiplier due to the budget constraint. The first order conditions are:
x
−β
i
[
nL
∑
k=1
x
1−β
k
] β
1−β
+ µpi = 0 ∀i (25a)
nL
∑
k=1
pkxk − c = 0. (25b)
The relative demand of any two variations is easily derived by division of equation (25a) for two
distinct i’s. Using the resulting expression to eliminate xk in (25b) and solving for xi, results in a demand
function for any xi (i is arbitrary):
xi =
c
p1/βi pˆ
pˆ =
nL
∑
k=1
p
β−1
β
k .
Substituting back into the utility function and simplifying gives:
v(~x) = cpˆ
β
1−β
.
The last three relations verify expressions (3a) – (3c).
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C Supply of Variations
Consider the producer of the ith variation of the consumption good. The problem of the firm manager is
to maximize the instantaneous profit rate. In doing so the manger must obey the first order conditions of
the optimization problem:
pii = max
xi, pi
xi pi−bc(xi) (26a)
s.t. xi =
C
p1/βi pˆ
(26b)
bc(xi) = ˆbcxi. (26c)
Naturally managers must choose a price quantity pair on the demand curve, given by (26b). The demand
curve was derived in Appendix B. The only difference is that spending by a single household, c, has
been replaced by aggregate spending, C, obtained by horizontal summation over all households.
By (26c) managers are constrained by the constant return to scale technology defined by the sec-
ond constrain in problem (6). For a simpler exposition ˆbc is used to denote marginal production cost,
accordingly defined as:
ˆbc =
[(
α
1−α
)1−α
+
(
α
1−α
)−α]
rαw1−αl
al
. (27)
As in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), it is assumed that managers overlook the impact of changing their own
price on the index pˆ, defined by (3c). This is only perfectly rational if there is an infinite number of
competing firms. Solving the problem above by inserting the cost function into the objective function,
and using µ to denote the Lagrangian multiplier due to the demand constraint, the first order conditions
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are:
pi + ˆbc + µ = 0 (28a)
xi + µ
1
β
C
pˆ
p
−
1−β
β
i = 0 (28b)
xi−
C
p1/βi pˆ
= 0. (28c)
The output price of the ith firm is easily solved for by direct insertion of (28a) and (28c) into (28b) to
eliminate xi and µ. The result is a pricing rule with a constant mark up over marginal cost:
pi =
ˆbc
1−β . (29a)
Clearly if there is no preference for variety, i.e. β = 0, the market becomes perfectly competitive and
price equals marginal cost. In order to determine the quantity supplied by each producer, xi, p1/βi pˆ must
be computed. As is clear from the pricing rule in (29a), all producers set the same price, since they all
have the same technology. The price index, defined in (3c), reduces to:
pˆ = nL
[
ˆbc
1−β
] β−1β
. (29b)
Given the price index and the demand curve, (28c), the supply of any firm, indexed by i, is:
xi =
(1−β)C
nˆbcL
. (29c)
Inserting pi, pˆ and xi into the profit function defined in (26a) and simplifying gives:
pii =
βC
nL
. (29d)
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After replacing C with cL and ˆbc by (27), relations (29a) – (29d) verify (7a) – (7c).
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